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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper analyzes how corporate capital gainstaxes affect the capital
gains realization decisions of firms. The paperoutlines the tax treatment
of corporate capital gains, the consequentincentives for firms with gains
and losses, the efficiency consequences ofthese taxes in the context of
other taxes and capital market distortions,and the response of firms to
these incentives. Despite receivinglimited attention, corporate capital
gains realizations have averaged 30 percentof individual capital gains
realizations over the last 50 years and haveincreased dramatically in
importance over the last decade. By1999, the ratio of net long-term capi-
tal gains to income subject to tax was 21 percentand was distributed
across various industries,which suggests the importance of realization
behavior to corporate financing decisions.Time-series analysis of aggre-
gate realization behavior demonstratesthat corporate capital gains taxes
affect realization behavior significantly.Similarly, an analysis of firm-level
investment and property, plant, andequipment (PPE) disposal decisions
This paper was prepared for the Tax Policy and the EconomyConference in November 2003
in Washington DC. We thank John Graham, JimHines, and Jim Poterba for helpful com-
ments and Sean Lubens for helpful researchassistance. Mihir A. Desai thanks the Division
of Research of Harvard Business School for generousfunding.2Desai & Gentry
and gains recognition behavior alsosuggests an important role for these
taxes in determining when firms raise money by disposing ofassets and
realizing gains.
1. INTRODUCTION
Analyses of the impact of the tax systemon corporate behavior typically
emphasize the role of the corporate incometax in altering firm financ-
ing and investment decisions. These financing andinvestment deci-
sions, in turn, have been shown to depend criticallyon the wedge
between the costs of internal and external finance.One obvious and
important source of internal finance, aside from retainedearnings, is the
disposal of assets and investments. The role oftaxes in influencing these
types of financing decisions may be nontrivial given thesystem of tax-
ing corporate capital gains and the distortions thatarise from costly
external finance.
Despite the potential importance of asset salesas a source of financing
corporate investment, relatively little research has been doneon how cor-
porate capital gains taxes might affect asset sales. Analysesof capital
gains taxes have focused almost exclusivelyon the realization behavior of
individuals, with particular attentionon the revenue consequences of
changing capital gains tax rates andon the impact on risk taking and
expected asset returns. The relative oversight of thecorporate capital
gains tax system is surprising given the substantial volumeof corporate
capital gainsU.S. corporations realized $146.5 billion ofnet long-term
capital gains, or 21 percent of their income subjectto tax, in 1999and the
potentially distortionary impact of these taxes stemmingfrom interac-
tions with capital market imperfections. In thispaper, we address this
oversight by detailing U.S. tax policy towardcorporate capital gains,
characterizing the nature and distribution ofcorporate capital gains activ-
ity, and examining the effect of these taxeson the financing and invest-
ment decisions of firms.
There are several important reasons for studying thetaxation of corpo-
rate capital gains. First, while many of the economic issuesregarding the
tax effects of corporate and individual capital gainsare similar, the possi-
ble distortions in the corporate and individualsettings differ along some
dimensions. For example, taxing corporate capitalgains can impede asset
sales and reorganizations that reallocate capital betweenfirms. If such
reallocations raise the productivity ofassets, then discouraging these
transactions reduces the pretax rate of return. In contrast, formost assets
held by individuals, the identity of theowner is unlikely to affect assetThe Character and Determinants of CorporateCapital Gains3
returns.' More generally, the increased emphasis onthe role of corporate
governance in determiningeconomic performance suggests that tax
policy that alters the incentives for cross-holding orcorporate venture
capital can have important economicconsequences.2 Finally, if firms are
deterred from disposing of assets as a result of thecapital gains tax, cor-
porate capital gains taxes potentiallyexacerbate pre-existing distortions
arising from capital market imperfectionsthat make external finance
more costly.
Second, President C. W. Bush's recent proposal toeliminate the dou-
ble taxation of corporate income brought tothe forefront the question
of the appropriate structure of capital incometaxation. With regard to
corporate investment in other corporations,U.S. tax policy provides
corporations some relief from multiplelayers of taxation on intercor-
porate dividends through thedividends received deduction (DRD),
which allows the exclusion of the majorityof intercorporate dividends
from the corporate income tax. The logicbehind the DRD is to avoid
having a full third layer of taxation oncapital income in the U.S. tax
system that already taxes corporateincome twice (i.e., corporate
income is taxed at the corporate leveland the dividends are taxed at the
shareholder level). By this logic, one might expectthat capital gains
earned on intercorporate investmentswould similarly be provided
some relief, but the taxcode does not provide a preferential corporate
tax rate for capital gains.Understanding how corporate capital gains
taxes influence the holdingbehavior of firms provides a first step in
understanding the consequences of this policy as anelement in the
overall system of capital taxation.
Third, the volume of corporate capital gains issubstantial, and increas-
ingly so, when compared to eitherindividual capital gains or other
metrics of corporate activity. From 1954-1999,corporations reported realized
1Edwards, Lang, Maydew, and Shackelford (2003) consider theeffect of such potential real-
locations by examining the stock market reaction to theGerman tax reform of 2000, which
eliminated the capital gains tax on corporate cross-holdings. GivenGermany's history of
substantial corporate cross-holdings, the reform waspredicted to have sweeping effects in
the level of merger and acquisition activity in Germany.Edwards et al. find a substantial
stock market impact of the reform, but it is concentrated among asmall number of banks
and insurance companies with substantialcross-holdings. They report that the early evi-
dence on the amount of corporate restructuringafter the tax reform does not support the
idea of widespread restructuring; however, theimplementation of the tax reform corre-
sponded to a worldwide slowdown in merger activity, so it isdifficult to measure the tax
effect.
2See Morck (2003) on the interaction of cross-holdingsand intercompany dividend tax pol-
icy; Wolfenzon (1999) on the consequencesof pyramidal ownership; and Gompers, Lerner,
and Scharfstein (2003) on corporate venture capital activity.4Desai & Gentry
net long-term capital gains that averaged 30 percent of the realizations
reported by individuals. By 1999, corporatenet long-term gains
were more than 20 percent of corporate income subject to tax andaver-
aged 16 percent through the 1990s. Froma tax policy perspective, given
that corporations face a tax rate of up to 35 percenton realized net capital
gains while individuals face a maximum tax rate of 15percent on capital
gains, the taxation of corporate capital gains has substantialrevenue
consequences.
We examine several aspects of corporate capital gainstaxation. The
incentives for realization are fairly complex, andwe begin with a discus-
sion of tax policy, with particular reference to the effects oftaxes on net
long-term gains. With the incentives and potentialeconomic effects estab-
lished, we outline the scope of this activity and distinguishamong the
types of capital gains realized and characterize their distributionrelative
to several benchmarks. We employ two empirical approachesto examine
the responsiveness of corporate capital gainsto variation in marginal
tax rates. Following Plesko (2002), we study the time-series behaviorof
aggregate corporate capital gains realizations. In this analysis,as in the
studies of individual capital gains taxes (see Auerbach, 1988,and Eichner
and Sinai, 2000), we rely on time-series variation intax policy to identify
possible tax effects on realizations. We add several additionalcontrols for
possible determinants of corporate capital gainsincludingproxies for
sentiment, consolidation activity and capital marketactivityand find
statistically significant tax price elasticities of approximately1.3 for cor-
porations with respect to realization behavior.
Such a time-series analysis is problematic for severalreasons, so we
turn to firm-level financial reporting data to examine whetherthe
propensity to sell assets or realize gains is related to firm-specificvaria-
tion in estimated marginal tax rates. For the firm-levelanalysis, the key
variation in effective tax rates arises due to the rules relatedto operating
losses. Using proxies for the marginal tax rate providedvia the method-
ology in Graham (1996) and controlling for firm characteristicsand time-
varying investment opportunities,we find that the sales of investments
and property, plant, and equipment (PPE)are more likely and consider-
ably larger in low-tax years. In addition to thisevidence on disposal
behavior, the likelihood and volume of gains isparticularly guided by
tax considerations.
Tn the next section, we review the basic tax rulesgoverning corporate
capital gains. In section 3, we discuss the various incentiveeffects of cor-
porate capital gains taxation, including both the efficiencycosts to such
taxes and how these taxes affect corporate tax planning efforts.In section
4, we provide an overview of the general features ofcorporate capitalThe Character and Determinants of Corporate Capital Gains5
gains realizations and broad time-series trends in those samerealizations.
Section 5 provides the results of our time-seriesanalysis of corporate
capital gains realizations. Section 6 presents analysisthat examines firm-
level variation in realization behavior. In section 7, weconclude with
directions for further research.
2. U.S. TAXATION OF CORPORATECAPITAL GAINS
In determining the tax burden on corporatecapital gains, three elements
are critical: the definitionof capital gains income for corporations; the
applicable tax rate on corporate capital gains income; andthe rules for
netting capital gains with other sources of income,including how capital
gains and losses interact with loss carryforwardrules. In this section, we
address each of these elements in turn and thenframe all of them in his-
torical and international perspective.3
21 Definition of Capital Gains
Capital gains or losses arise from the sale of capital assets.Capital assets
are defined as all assets except:(1) inventory; (2) accounts or notes receiv-
able through the ordinary course of business; (3) real ordepreciable prop-
erty used in a business; (4) copyright,literary, musical, or artistic
compositions held by the creator; and (5) certainpublications of the U.S.
government.4 The major categories of capital assets include: (1)invest-
ment assets, such as stocks and bonds; (2) assets(including land) held for
long-term investment rather than commercial purposes;(3) self-created
patents (see Internal Revenue Code, section1235); and (4) goodwill and
going-concern value created by a firm.
In addition to the sale of capital assets, capital gains canarise from the
sale of real or depreciable property (so-called section1231 assets) under
some circumstances. If these assets aresold for a loss (e.g., the sales price
is less than the basis after adjusting for depreciation),then the loss is con-
sidered ordinary in character. If such assets are sold for again relative to
the adjusted basis, then the character of the incomedepends on the recap-
ture rules. To the extent that the gain arisesfrom deductions for previous
Our discussion of the tax rules for corporate capital gains focuses onthe regular corporate
income tax without considering the effects of the alternative minimumtax (AMT). In gen-
eral, under current tax rules, capital gains realizations do not generatepreference items for
the AMT. For the sale of depreciable assets, however, the AMT usesslower depreciation
schedules, which tend to result in smaller gains (or larger losses) from thesale of such assets.
This difference in depreciation schedules tends to reduce the tentativeAIVIT tax liability for
a corporation that sells depreciable assets.
Section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code.6Desai & Gentry
depreciation, the gain is considered ordinary income; however, fora gain
in excess of the amount of previous depreciation, the gain is considered
capital in character. The logic behind the recapture rules that classify
gains associated with previous depreciation as ordinary income is that the
firm has previously deducted the depreciation allowance from ordinary
income but is selling the asset for more than its adjusted basis, whichsug-
gests that the depreciation allowances accrued faster than the asset actu-
ally depreciated.5
A critical element of the definition of a capital gain is that it dependson
an observable transaction, typically the sale of an asset. The realization-
based nature of capital gains taxation createsnumerous tax planning
incentives, as discussed below. It also complicates measuring the annual
effective tax rate on capital gains because the holding period influences
the present value of the tax liability associated with owning theasset.
When statutory tax rates do not increase over time, the abilityto defer the
realization of gains reduces the tax burden on the investment.
2.2 Tax Rates on Corporate Capital Gains
Unlike individuals who face lower tax rateson capital gains income than
on ordinary income, U.S. corporations do not receive preferential tax rates
on realized capital gains. Net realized capital gains are added to ordinary
income when computing the firm's taxable income.6 Becausecorporations
do not receive a preferential tax rateon capital gains income relative to
ordinary income, the distinction between capital income and ordinary
income is often not critical for a firm's tax liability. As discussed below,
however, the character of income affects which types of incomecan be
netted against other types of income and the rules for how firmswith net
losses can use losses to offset previousor future income.
2.3 Combining Capital Gains, Losses, and Ordinary Income
Much of the complexity of taxing corporate capital gains arises fromthe
rules associated with matching different types of capital gains andlosses
(e.g., short-term versus long-term), pooling different types of income,arid
carrying losses forward and backward. The general rule is that ordinary
The recapture rules are especially important when depreciation allowances fortax pur-
poses are accelerated relative to economic depreciation and when capital gains income faces
a lower tax rate than ordinary income. Both of these conditions held before 1986 and created
incentives for firms to chum assets by depreciating new assets and then selling them fora
gain. For an analysis of these incentives and the role of the recapture rules,see Gordon,
Hines, and Summers (1987).
6For historical reasons, corporations technically have the option of adding capitalgains to
ordinary income or facing an alternative tax rate of 35 percent, which is thesame as the cur-
rent top corporate marginal tax rate.The Character and Determinants of Corporate CapitalGains7
income and losses, capital gains and losses,and gains or losses on section
1231 assets are aggregated separately. Within capital gains,taxpayers sep-
arately aggregate short-term (defined as having aholding period of less
than one year) capital gains and losses and long-termcapital gains and
losses (including any capital gains from thedisposition of section 1231
assets). If one of the holding period baskets results in a netgain and the
other holding period basket results in a net loss, thenthe net loss in one
basket can be used to offset the net gain in the otherbasket.
After completing this two-step netting process, a netcapital gain is
included in taxable income; however, corporations are notallowed to use a
net capital loss to offset ordinaryincome.7 Instead, corporations with net
capital losses must apply the carryback andcarryforward rules. Current
law allows capital losses to be carried back to offset netcapital gains in the
previous three years or carried forward to offset netcapital gains in the sub-
sequent five years.8 Because the tax law does notallow for an interest cal-
culation to compensate for the time value of money,carrying losses forward
is less valuable than an immediate tax refund ordeduction against ordinary
income (assuming that the firm's statutory tax rateis constant over time).
In general, the netting rules give corporations apreference for capital
gains income over ordinary income but ordinarylosses over capital
losses. Capital gains have an advantage overordinary income in their
ability to offset capital losses. In contrast, ordinary losses arepreferable to
capital losses because they can offset ordinary income orcapital gains
income, while capital losses can offset capitalgains only via the netting
rules for capital gains.
2.4 Tax Policy Toward Corporate Capital
Gains over Time
Tax rules governing corporate capital gainshave changed over time in a
variety of ways. One major change over time iswhether corporate capital
gains face a preferential rate relative to ordinaryincome. Before the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, corporations could basetheir tax liability on having
net capital gains (i.e., net long-termcapital gains in excess of net short-
term losses) taxed at an alternative tax rate.The corporation would pay
the minimum of its tax liability, including netcapital gains as ordinary
In contrast, individuals have a limited opportunity to offsetordinary income with capital
losses.
8In contrast, individuals who exceed the annual limit on usingcapital losses to offset ordi-
nary income have an unlimited numberof years to carry forward capital losses to offset
future capital gains. In addition, the time limits on corporate carryoversfor capital gains dif-
fer from those for operating losses. Operating losses can becarried back by two years or car-
ried forward for 20 years.8Desai & Gentry
income and using the alternative tax rate. In 1986, this alternativetax rate
was 28 percent, while the maximum tax rate on ordinary incomewas 46
percent. Between 1954 and 1986, the alternative tax rate varied between 25
and 30 percent.
It is worth noting two features of the alternative tax ratesystem. First,
because the same alternative rate is applied to all firms,corporations with
relatively low income might prefer the ordinary incometax rate over the
alternative tax rate due to the graduated corporate taxrate schedule.
Second, because the definition of net capital gainsuses the distinction
between long- and short-term capital gains, the holding perioddistinction
was more important before 1986 than it was after 1986, with corporations
preferring to realize long-term capital gains rather than short-termcapital
gains, thus qualifying for the lower alternative tax rate.9
2.5 An International Perspective on the Taxation
of Corporate Capital Gains
The taxation of capital gains for both individuals andcorporations varies
substantially across countries. Policies can differ along several dimen-
sions. First, how are capital gains taxed relative to other forms of income?
Second, do the tax rules for corporate capital gains differ from thetax
rules for the capital gains of individuals? One difference is whether capi-
tal gains are taxed at a different tax rate than the taxrate for ordinary
income, including the possibility of exemption or exclusion from taxation.
This rate differential can be targeted toward specific types ofassets (e.g.,
shares in publicly traded firms) or require specific holding periods (e.g.,a
lower tax rate on long-term capital gains thanon short-term capital
gains). Indexing of cost basis is another policy option, although it issome-
what rare. Some countries allow for exemptions for individuals ofsome
threshold amount of gains in each year. For example, in 1998, France
allowed $8,315 of gains to be excluded from personal income taxation.10
However, these policies do not typically extend to corporate shareholders.
As evidence that the holding-period distinction affected behavior, consider therelation-
ship between (1) the difference between the top ordinary income tax rate and the long-term
capital gains tax rate and (2) the ratio of net short-term gains to net long-termgains (taken
from the Corporate Statistics of income data described below). From 1954to 1986, the dif-
ference between the ordinary income tax rate and the capital gainstax rate for corporations
ranged from 18 to 27.8 percentage points, and the annual ratio of short-termto long-term
gains averaged 0.057. From 1988 to 1998, there was no difference in thetax rates, and the
ratio of short-term to long-term gains was 0.20. Thus, when it wasmore advantageous to rec-
ognize long-term capital gains instead of short-term gains (i.e., the earlier years), short-term
gains were a much smaller percentage of total realizations than when firmswere indifferent
to the holding period.
° See American Councilon Capital Formation (1998).The Character and Determinants of CorporateCapital Gains9
In addition, countries can allowfor rollover provisions in which gains
continue to be deferred, providedthe proceeds are invested in specific
types of assets.
The American Council on CapitalFormation (1998) surveyed capital
gains taxation across 24 countriesfor 1998.11 Of the 24 countries, six
(Belgium, Denmark, Hong Kong,the Netherlands, Poland, and Sing-
apore) exempted long-term and (exceptfor Denmark) short-term capi-
tal gains income for both individualsand corporations. Three countries
(China, Korea, and Taiwan)exempted gains associated with local com-
panies or companies traded on themajor stock exchange, but they taxed
gains on other equities (andpresumably gains associated with other
assets). Another five countries(Canada, France, India, Indonesia, and
Italy) had long-term capital gains tax ratesbelow the top marginal income
tax rate for both individualsand corporations. In eight countries(Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan,Mexico, Sweden, the United King-
dom, and the United States),individuals faced preferential tax rates
(relative to ordinary income) for long-termcapital gains, but corporations
faced the top marginal income tax rate oncapital gains.'2 In three of these
countries (Argentina, Germany,and Mexico), individual shareholders
were exempt fromcapital gains taxes.13 In two countries(Australia and
Chile), capital gains were taxed at theordinary income tax rates for both
individuals and corporations; however,Australia allowed for indexing of
cost basis for both individualsand corporations, while Chile allowed cor-
porations to index their cost basis andprovided individuals an exemption
for the first $6,600 of capital gains.
Even this cursory review ofcapital gains taxes in other countries
reveals substantial heterogeneity in taxpolicies toward capital gains. The
U.S. tax system of preferential capitalgains tax rates for individuals but
The survey, conducted by Arthur Andersen,focuses on the tax treatment of investment in
equities. The countries included in the survey areArgentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, France, Germany,Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands,Poland, Singapore, Sweden, Taiwan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Presumably, manycountries have special tax rules per-
taining to the gains or losses on specific assets.
12 Among these countries, Japan and the United Kingdom aresomewhat different than the
others. In Japan, individual taxpayers have achoice between a 20.0 percent tax rate on the
net gain (which is lower than the topmarginal tax rate on ordinary income) or a tax of 1.25
percent on the sales price, In the UnitedKingdom, individuals faced a sliding scale of tax
rates so that the tax rate fell as theholding period increased; with a holdingperiod of 10
years, an individual wouldinclude only 25 percent of the capital gains in the taxbase. For
corporations in the United Kingdom in 1998,the tax system allowed corporations to index
their cost basis in calculating the gain.
13As discussed above, Germany subsequentlyeliminated the corporate capital gains tax on
corporate cross-holdings.10Desai & Gentry
not for corporations is a relativelycommon approach, but even more
countries provide preferential tax rates forcorporate capital gains income
relative to ordinary income (either in theform of lower tax rates or
exemption). The issue of the relative taxation ofdividends and capital
gains is also likely to differacross countries given the variation in the
extent to which different countries have integratedtheir personal and
corporate income tax systems. An open empirical questionis whether this
heterogeneity in tax policy affects asset allocationand investment deci-
sions and the level of the cross-ownership ofcorporate shares across
countries.
3. CORPORATE CAPITAL GAINS TAXESAND
INCENTIVES
The taxation of corporate capital gains affectsincentives in three broad
categories. First, it affects real decisions relatedto investment and financ-
ing and the allocation of capitalacross firms and throughout the economy.
Second, taxes can affect the timing ofcorporate decisions. Third, tax poi-
icy toward corporate capital gainscan affect corporate tax planning activ-
ities. In this section, we discuss each of thesetypes of possible behavioral
responses.
3.1 The Allocation of Capital and CorporateCapital
Gains Taxes
The allocation effects of capital gains taxationhave primarily been dis-
cussed in the context of individual investors, andit is useful to anchor a
discussion of the allocation effects forcorporations in this literature. For
individuals, capital gains taxescan affect investment decisions in two
ways. First, for deciding among assets in which to invest,assuming that
the statutory tax rate is held constant, the effectivetax rate on an asset that
is taxed on realization is lower than the effectivetax rate on an asset
whose return is taxed annually.14 Thus,assets with returns that are taxed
on realization have a tax advantage relative to assets that faceannual tax-
ation. In addition to affecting capital allocationby pushing more capital
into assets that produce capital gains, this differentialtaxation can also
affect asset prices and future returns. Inresponse to their favorable tax
14 We focuson the effects of realization-based taxation. In addition, policymakers frequently
debate whether capital gains should be taxed ata lower tax rate than other types of income,
under the common assertion that a lower tax rateon risky investment promotes risk taking.
Despite the common claim that lower tax rateson capital gains promote risk taking, the the-
oretical relationship between the tax rate and theamount of risk taking is ambiguous
because the tax rate affects both the expectedreturn and the variability of returns.The Character and Determinants of CorporateCapital Gains11
treatment, assets that yield capital gains mayoffer lower pretax rates of
return (after adjusting for risk),which might offset the tax advantages of
capital gains generating investments.
Second, once investors have an appreciatedposition, realization-based
taxation provides an incentive for investorsto defer their tax liability by
delaying the sale of their assets. Thisincentive to delay realization is
known as the lock-in effect, which iscommonly analyzed in the context of
individuals who own a portfolio of financialassets.15 By deferring real-
ization, investors effectively receive aninterest-free loan in the amount
that they would pay in taxes if theysold the asset and paid taxes. The
lock-in effect distorts investors' portfoliochoices because it creates a fric-
tion for reallocating capital acrossinvestments. Investors may retain an
appreciated position even when anotherinvestment would provide a
superior expected return after controllingfor the riskiness of the position.
In contrast, if an asset falls in value,then investors may have an incen-
tive to accelerate selling the asset tobenefit from deducting the loss
against other income (when allowed).Thus, realization-based taxation
provides incentives for selective realizationsby which investors typically
minimize taxes by selling their losersand holding their winners. In the
extreme, these optimal tradingstrategies create opportunities to eliminate
income taxation (see Stiglitz, 1983);however, the combination of transac-
tion costs and tax restrictions (e.g.,loss limitation rules) prevent these
strategies from abusing the capital gainstax rules to the point of elimi-
nating overall income taxation.
Poterba (2002) reviews the efficiency consequencesof capital gains tax-
ation on individuals. One of thechallenges for modeling the deadweight
loss of capital gains taxation isthat a complete model requires under-
standing investors' trading behavior inthe absence of taxation. Trading
behavior depends in part on heterogeneousbeliefs about future returns,
an aspect of tradingbehavior that has proven to be adifficult feature to
include in a model with taxation. Partof the deadweight loss arises
because individuals hold suboptimalportfolios in terms of riskiness or in
terms of expectations aboutfuture returns. This distortion is greaterif
individuals' risk preferences change with age orif the risk characteristics
of an investment change over time.Also, the distortion is probably
smaller when investors have relativelysimilar beliefs about future returns
or have the ability toundertake investment trading strategiesthat allow
investors to reap the benefits of asale (e.g., liquidity and disposition of
risk) without triggering a capital gain.
15 For recent analyses of the lock-in effect, see Klein (1999, 2001)and Dammon, Spatt, and
Zhang (2001).12Desai & Gentry
For evaluating the efficiency costs ofcorporate capital gains taxation,
some of the issues that are pertinent for analyzing individualsare less
important for corporations. For example, life-cycleconcerns about savings
and portfolio choice are not critical issues forcorporations. Likewise, con-
cerns about a mismatch between risk preferences and the riskinessof a port-
folio of assets are less likely to beconcerns for corporate investors because
the individuals who own the corporationcan diversify such risk issues.
However, the distortions from capital gainstaxes may have effects on
corporations that are less relevant for individualsCorporate investment
often differs from the types of investmentsmade by individuals For indi-
viduals, the identity of the owner ofan asset rarely affects the asset's rate
of return, at least for the portfolio investmentsoften considered in dis-
cussing the lock-in effect. While thismay be true for the liquid invest-
ments of corporations, the identity of theowner of corporate assets often
affects the return on the assets. Returns generatedfrom matching specific
assets with specific owners add another dimensionto the deadweight loss
from capital gains taxation. For example,consider a corporation that is
considering selling a division to another firm. If theincumbent owner has
an unrealized capital gain on the division, then the capital gainstax might
impede the transaction, even when the potentialacquirer has a relatively
high rate of return from owning the division.When the realization-based
capital gains tax discourages transactions, thesocial cost is the difference
in the returns that could be earned by thetwo different owners.
In addition to the possibility of mismatchingin the asset market, the pat-
terns of corporate cross-holdings and the accompanyinggovernance issues
associated with those cross-holdings could be influencedby corporate capi-
tal gains taxation. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, andShleifer (1999) document
the wide variety of corporate cross-ownershipin the world and the preva-
lence of pyramidal ownership, to which theU.S. experience is a notable
exception. Morck (2003) suggests that tax ruleson intercorporate dividends
(for which, as Morck shows, the United Statesis exceptional compared to
other countries in levying an income tax) andcorporate dividends to share-
holders interact in the United Statesso that pyramidal ownership and the
associated potential governance abusesare prevented. Presumably, the tax
on corporate capital gains is an even more important deterrentto cross-hold-
ings given the DRD.16 In addition to these effectson the patterns of owner-
ship, corporate capital gains taxesmay shape corporate venture capital
16Paul (2003) argues that the triple taxation embedded incorporate capital gains taxation
has grown more important recently because U.S.corporations have entered into more rela-
tionships that involve intercorporate equity holdings.In addition, she discusses how the
repeal of the General Utilities doctrineas part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has increased
the importance of corporate capital gains taxation.The Character and Determinants of CorporateCapital Gains13
activity and the overall venture capital environment,given the interactions
between corporate venture capital and venturecapital more generally.'7
Finally, capital market imperfections mayexacerbate the efficiency
costs of the taxation of corporatecapital gains taxation. Without capital
market imperfections, corporations could finance newprojects by attract-
ing new investors; with capital marketimperfections, asset sales can be a
source of financing for newprojects. The possibility of selling existing
assets to finance new projects hasreceived relatively little attention in the
corporate finance literature. As elaboratedbelow, corporate capital gains
realizations constitute a significant fractionof corporate cash flow. As a
transaction-based tax, the capital gains tax extracts atoll from firms that
want to sell one set of assets to invest inanother set of assets.
Overall, the magnitude of the economic distortionscaused by capital
gains taxation depends on the elasticityof behavior along the various rel-
evant margins. For individuals,understanding the elasticity of capital
gains realizations to the tax rate is a startingpoint for measuring the effi-
ciency cost; however, the realizationselasticity does not measure the
extent to which the capital gains taxdistorts portfolio composition. For
corporations, the efficiency cost depends onthe heterogeneity in asset
returns across different owners andthe extent to which the capital gains
tax reduces capital reallocation acrossfirms. However, measuring the
elasticity of realizations with respect to the tax rate maycapture only a
small part of the efficiency cost of corporatecapital gains taxation.
3.2 Fluctuations in Tax Rates andTiming Incentives
for Corporate Capital Gains
In addition to the relationship between thelevels of realization and tax rates,
when tax rates change over time, either due tolegislated changes in the tax
code or due to changes in finn-specificcharacteristics, firms have an incen-
tive to time their reali7atlOrls of capital gainsand capital losses. The simple
adage is realize losses when the marginal tax rateis high and realize gains
when the tax rate is low. If firms anticipatechanges in future tax rates, then
anticipated tax rate increases can induce firms tosell assets with appreciated
values and to defer the sale of assets withunrealized capital losses.
A standard issue in the debate over therealizations elasticity of indi-
vidual capital gains is separating the responsivenessof realizations into
the responsiveness to permanent changes in tax rates versustransitory
changes in tax rates.18 A response to transitorychanges in tax rates is more
likely to involve a pure shift in the timingof asset sales rather than an
See Gompers and Lerner (2002) and Gompers, Lerner,and Scharfstein (2003).
18See Burman and Randolph (1994).14Desai & Gentry
increase in the long-run amount of realizations. Thissame issue arises
when considering corporate capital gains. Changes intax policy can lead
to anticipated changes in tax rates that affect behavior.
Given the graduated corporate tax rate system and the losscarryfor-
ward regime, variabffity in corporate profitabilitycan generate firm-specific
variation in effective marginal tax rates. For example,a firm with net oper-
ating loss carryforwards can recognize capital gains withoutpaying taxes in
the current year. Instead, the realized gain offsetspart of the net operating
loss carryforward and reduces the stock of carryforwards takeninto the
future. The reali7ed capital gain wifi most likely increase the firm'sfuture tax
liabffity when it returns to paying taxes.
3.3 Tax Planning and Corporate Capital Gains Taxes
The taxation of capital gains also affects the tax-planning effortsof U.S.
corporations. In general, these tax-planningresponses lead to financial
consequences without greatly changing the real activity of the firm. A
general rule for corporate tax planning is that firms preferto have capital
gains income but ordinary losses because capital gainscan be used to off-
set either capital losses or ordinary losses.
We now turn to several examples of corporatetax planning that are
affected by realization-based taxation of gains, especially capitalgains. Our
first example is how the realization-based nature of capitalgains taxation
affects the design of merger and acquisition transactions.We already dis-
cussed how capital gains taxes can inhibitsome asset sales. In addition, the
tax rules influence the form of asset transfers. Insome cases, it is possible to
structure an acquisition so that it defers the realization of capital gainstaxes;
a common feature in deferring the capital gains tax is that the selleraccepts
stock instead of cash from the acquirer.19 For example,instead of selling a
division for cash and realizing a gain,a corporation can exchange its equity
in the division for stock of the acquirer and defer the realizationof the gain.
Early empirical research on the effects oftaxes on merger and acquisi-
tion activity found a limited role for taxes. Auerbachand Reishus (1988)
find that only a minority of mergers from 1968to 1983 had large enough
tax benefits that the taxes may have been a motivating factor in thereor-
ganization.2° They also find little evidence of taxes affectingthe form of
19See Scholes et al. (2002) for an overview of how capital gainstaxes affect mergers and
acquisitions.
20Auerbach and Reishus (1988) focused on elements of the tax code thatpotentially made
mergers more attractive, such as allowing firms to use tax losses and credits (rather than
carry them forward), a step up in asset basis, and increased interest deductions; Franks,
Harris, and Mayer (1988) also conclude that taxes do notseem to affect the form of the trans-
action for mergers.The Character and Determinants of Corporate Capital Gains15
acquisitions, but they recognize that their measuresof tax benefits are
imprecisely measured. In contrast, more recent researchhas documented
a role for taxes in corporatereorganizations. For example, Maydew,
Schipper, and Vincent (1999) examine a sampleof divestitures in which
the parent corporation could choose either an assetsale that would trig-
ger the realization of gains or atax-free spin-off that would not trigger
taxation. They find that the size of the taxdifferential between divestiture
methods affects the form of divestiture; firms withthe largest potential
tax benefits from using a spin-off optfor spin-offs.21 Thus, realization-
based taxation affects the form of the transaction.The realization-based
taxes on the sellers in a corporatereorganization can also affect the price
paid in the reorganization. Ayers, Lefanowicz,and Robinson (2003) report
that the acquisition premium associated withtaxable stock acquisitions
increases with the capital gains taxesof the target shareholders
(although their sample is based on individualrather than corporate
shareholders). Erickson and Wang (2000) examinethe acquisition prices
when one corporation buys a subsidiary fromanother corporation and
find that the price paid depends on the tax on thegain realized by the
selling corporation.
A second tax-planning example is that therealization-based nature of
capital gains taxation provides an incentive for investorsto seek alterna-
tives to selling their investments. Onepossibility is to enter into a hedg-
ing transaction that can reduce the riskof the position and possibly raise
cash. Such hedging transactions may be relevantwhen a corporation
obtains shares in another corporation as payment in acorporate reorgan-
ization.22 Corporations can execute these hedgingtransactions through
either private deals with investment banks orby issuing exchangeable
securities. Gentry and Schizer (2003) examine asample of corporations
that issue public securities as a way of hedging anappreciated position,
raising cash, and deferring capital gainstaxation. While the volume of
public transactions has been relatively modest(roughly $25 billion
between 1993 and 2001), private transactions mayactually have lower
transaction costs and thus may be the predominantform of hedging.
Again, the government designs tax rules, such asrules that treat the trans-
action as a sale if the issuer has eliminatedall the risk of the position, to
21In general, Maydew, Schipper, and Vincent (1999) reportthat the potential nontax bene-
fits of taxable transactions (e.g., raising capital from assetsales may be a relatively inexpen-
sive source of funds) lead many firms to use taxable assetsales and forego the tax benefits
of a spin-off.
For example, in 1996, Kerr-McGee acquired stockof Devon Energy in exchange for some
oil fields, and in 1999 Kerr-McGee issued securities thathedged some of the risk of holding
Devon Energy stock. See Gentry and Schizer (2003)for more examples of such transactions.16Desai & Gentry
make this sort of tax planning difficult. Nonetheless,corporate capital
gains taxation plays an important role in securities market innovations
aimed at allowing firms to avoid the realization-based tax.
A third example of tax-planning incentives arises from the differential
taxation of corporate capital gains income and intercorporate dividend
income. As mentioned in the introduction, the dividends received deduc-
tion (DRD) for intercorporate dividends providessome relief from the
potential triple taxation of corporate income when corporationsown
shares in other corporations. The DRD typically reduces thetax rate on
intercorporate dividends by 70 percent. Thus,a corporation facing a 35
percent tax rate on ordinary income faces a 10.5 percent tax rateon divi-
dend income; however, capital losses are deductible against capitalgains
so that the tax rate on capital losses may still be 35 percent. The DRD
makes corporations a natural clientele to invest in high-dividendyield
stocks, such as preferred stock.23 In addition, these clientele effectscan
affect when a corporation sells stock. For a corporation consideringsell-
ing shares near the ex-dividend day, the DRD providesan incentive for
the corporation to delay the sale until after the ex-dividend day because
this delay increases the dividend portion of the return and increasesthe
after-tax return.
At the extreme, these clientele effects give corporationsan incentive to
engage in short-term trading strategies known as dividend captureor
dividend stripping. Dividend stripping isan investment strategy aimed
at earning dividend income even if the dividend income is offset byan
equal amount of capital losses. Supposea corporation can invest in a
high-yield stock just before its ex-dividend day and thaton the ex-
dividend day, the stock price drops one forone with the amount of the
dividend. A short-term position in this stock might yield $100,000 ofdivi-
dend income but would also result in $100,000 in capital losses,so that
the economic income on the position iszero. However, the dividend
income might result in a tax liability of $10,500, while the capital loss
(assuming that it can be used to offset capital gains) createsa tax benefit
of $35,000. Thus, the tax-rate differential createsa net benefit of $24,500.
Given the size of this potential tax arbitrage, it is not surprisingthat the
tax code includes various restrictions limiting this type of strategy, pri-
marily minimum holding period requirements to qualify for the DRD.
Evidence about the importance of dividend stripping isscarce. The
most direct evidence is from Koski and Scruggs's (1998) examination of
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) trading audit data from the early
For evidence consistent with the formation of investor dienteles for dividends,see
Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Trezevant (1999).The Character and Determinants of CorporateCapital Gains17
1990s. The data includes the buying andselling volume of different types
of traders. Consistent with corporatedividend capture, they find
increased trading volume for corporations justbefore the ex-dividend
day. The strength of the result istempered, however, by this increase in
volume being uncorrelated with thedividend yield, whereas one would
expect a positive correlation becausethe profitability of dividend strip-
ping increases with dividend yield. Inaddition, Naranjo, Nimalendran,
and Ryngaert (2000) examine theex-dividend stock returns of high yield
stocks. They find that after May 1975,when brokered commissions were
introduced on the New York Stock Exchange,the ex-dividend day returns
for these stocks were negative (i.e., on theex-dividend day, share prices
fall by more than one for one with thedividend) in every year except 1994,
which is consistent with corporate dividend captureaffecting the stock
returns due to corporations bidding upthe price of the shares before the ex-
dividend day. Furthermore, these negative returns arecorrelated with the
corporate tax differential on dividendand capital gains income, consistent
with the tax differential driving tradingbehavior. Grammatikos (1989)
focuses on the 1984 tax changes that increasedthe holding period required
to qualify for the DRD, whichpresumably increased the cost of dividend
stripping by increasing the associated risk.Consistent with the increased
holding period reducing dividend stripping,Grammatikos reports that
abnormal returns on the ex-dividend dayincreased after the tax change.
Overall, these studies suggest that corporations engagein some amount of
dividend capture trading but that both transactioncosts associated with
trading and tax restrictions play important roles inlimiting this behavior.
4. THE SCOPE OF CORPORATECAPITAL GAINS
Before turning to the effects of corporatecapital gains taxes on the real-
ization behavior of firms, it is useful to get a senseof the magnitude and
distribution of corporate capital gains. Data on corporatecapital gains is
available from 1954 to 1999 through the Statisticsof Income (SOT) reports
on corporation income tax returns.The top panel of Table 1 provides sum-
mary numbers on the aggregateamount of gains for 1999 distinguished
by type of gain. In 1999, net long-termcapital gains realized by all corpo-
rate entities amounted to $146.5billion, net short-term capital gains real-
ized amounted to $94.9 billion, and net gains onall noncapital assets
amounted to $64.7 billion. Given the proliferationof pass-through corpo-
rate entities and the possible concentrationof capital gains in particular
sectors, it is useful to isolate thevolume of gains according to these dis-
tinctions. While net long-term capitalgains and net gains on noncapital









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































%The Character and Determinants of CorporateCapital Gains19
short-term capital gains in 1999 werein pass-through entities, most of
which were in the finance, insurance,and real estate (FIRE) sector.
To isolate further the sectoraldistribution of gains and to ensure that
they do not reflect a peculiarityassociated with 1999, the bottom two pan-
els of Table 1 provide the share ofoverall economic activity and of gain
activity through the 1990s for manufacturing,FIRE, and other industries
for all entities and for onlynon-pass-through entities. Throughout the
1990s, net short-term gains wereconcentrated in FIRE. In contrast, net
long-term gains were distributed acrossall three industrial groupings in
a manner that accordswith the underlying distribution of assets across
those groupings. Finally, net gains onnoncapital assets are dispropor-
tionately in manufacturing and otherindustries (relative to their shares of
total assets), which suggests that thesegains correspond to the section
1231 assets described above. Given thedistribution of gain activity across
sectors and types, the analysisand descriptive statistics that follow
emphasize net long-term gains from theSQl data.
The data in Table 1 distinguish betweenshort-term and long-term gains
and separate the gains on noncapital assets,but they do not address what
specific types of assets are being sold. Whilesuch a breakdown is not readily
available for the United States, Inland Revenuereports what types of assets
underlie corporate capital gains realizationsfor the United Kingdom.24 For
the accounting period ending2000-2001,51 percent of the gains of non-life-
insurance companies were fromfinancial assets; more specifically, 16 percent
were from shareslisted on the London exchange, 16 percent werefrom
unquoted shares, 17 percent were from sellingsubsidiaries, and 2 percent
were from otherfinancial assets. The remaining 49 percentof capital gains
were from nonfinancial assetsthat were concentrated in intangible assets(27
percent of total gains) andcommercial assets (13 percent of total gains). In
terms of holding periods, for gainsrealized in 2000-2001, 70 percent of the
gains on financial assets and 58 percentof the gains on nonfinancial assets
were on assets heldfor over 10 years, which highlights the importanceof tax
deferral for gains taxation?5 To the extentthat U.S. and U.K. corporations are
similar, these data provide a general pictureof the types of assets that gener-
ate corporate capital gains in theUnited States.
Given the familiarity withcapital gains realized by individuals,
it is useful to frame the volumeof net long-term corporate capital gains
24 Inland Revenue, National Statistics, http: //www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/stats/CaPital_
gains/menu.htm. It is worth noting that Inland Revenue statesthat annual data varies sub-
stantially across years.
The pattern of holding periods varies overtime (even more than the variation in the
sources of gains); for 1999-2000, 37 percentof realized gains on financial assets and 54 per-
cent of gains on nonfinancial assets werefrom assets held over 10 years.20Desai & Gentry
10
Year
FIGURE 1. Ratio of Corporate to IndividualCapital Gains, 1954-1997
Note: The figure plots the ratio of corporate capital gains to individualcapital gains from 1954 to 1997.
Corporate capital gains are defined as net long-term capital gains reducedby net short-term losses for all
active corporations. Ratios are expressed in percentage terms.
realizations relative to those gains. As Figure 1demonstrates, the ratio of
realized corporate capital gains to realized individualcapital gains has
averaged approximately 0.30 from 1954 to 1998.It is useful to note that
this ratio has evolved significantlyover that period. Until the late 1970s,
this ratio was both relatively lower andmore consistent than the period
after the late 1970s. Specifically, from 1980on, this ratio averaged 0.36, and
it ranged from a high of 0.45 in 1987 toa low of 0.28 in 1984. Overall, the
relative magnitude of corporate and individualcapital gains suggests fur-
ther research on corporate capital gains iswarranted, especially because
corporations face higher tax rates on capital gains thanindividuals face.
To give a sense of how important capital gainsare for corporate behav-
ior, it useful to frame the magnitude and trendsin corporate capital gains
realizations relative to corporate cash flow andassets. To do so, Table 2
provides the ratio of net long-term capitalgains realizations to income
subject to tax and assets and the ratio of all gainsto assets for the 1990s by
industrial grouping. Of course, the gainmay be much smaller than the
proceeds raised by selling an assetso that merely measuring gains under-
states the importance of asset sales for cash flow.26 Thisratio may be sub-
ject to cyclical effects because itwas at its highest value (33.5 percent)
26 Jf corporationsmore readily sell assets with losses than those with gains (apattern
encouraged by the tax rules), then the net gainmay be a very small fraction of the cash pro-
ceeds from aggregate sales.The Character and Determinants of Corporate Capital Gains21
TABLE 2
Scope of Corporate Capital Gains, Non-Pass-Through Entities,
1990-1999
Note: The top panel provides the ratios of net long-term gains to income subject to tax for all non-pass-
through entities through the 1990s for all industries and selected subindustries. The middlepanel pro-
vides the ratios of net long-term gains to total assets for all non-pass-through entitiesthrough the t990s
for all industries arid selected subindustries. The bottom panel provides the ratios of all gains to assetsfor
all non-pass-through entities through the 1990s for all industries and selected subindustries.
Year All industries Manufacturing FIRE Other industries
Ratio of net long-term gains to income subject to tax
1990 33.5% 21.0% 62.9% 27.4%
1991 11.7% 7.4% 19.6% 9.2%
1992 11.9% 7.3% 22.5% 8.6%
1993 12.2% 8.5% 22.2% 8.0%
1994 9.6% 8.3% 12.3% 7.8%
1995 10.8% 7.1% 17.3% 8.5%
1996 11.7% 8.3% 21.1% 8.4%
1997 14.7% 10.0% 22.8% 8.4%
1998 18.7% 9.8% 38.9% 9.9%
1999 20.9% 13.2% 31.9% 10.3%
Ratio of net long-term gains to assets
1990 0.27% 0.36% 0.16% 0.42%
1991 0.25% 0.29% 0.17% 0.37%
1992 0.26% 0.28% 0.24% 0.28%
1993 0.29% 0.36% 0.27% 0.25%
1994 0.24% 0.40% 0.13% 0.36%
1995 0.28% 0.35% 0.21% 0.39%
1996 0.32% 0.43% 0.27% 0.33%
1997 0.38% 0.50% 0.27% 0.57%
1998 0.42% 0.38% 0.43% 0.43%
1999 0.45% 0.50% 0.31% 0.55%
Ratio of all gains to assets
1990 0.46% 0.64% 0.26% 0.76%
1991 0.46% 0.54% 0.33% 0.69%
1992 0.47% 0.52% 0.41% 0.58%
1993 0.50% 0.62% 0.44% 0.54%
1994 0.41% 0.67% 0.20% 0.68%
1995 0.50% 0.66% 0.34% 0.75%
1996 0.54% 0.83% 0.37% 0.69%
1997 0.62% 0.92% 0.40% 0.94%
1998 0.67% 0.80% 0.56% 0.70%
1999 0.67% 0.83% 0.41% 0.84%22Desai & Gentry
during the one economic downturn during this period (1990). Ingen-
eral, for all industries, there seems to be an upward trend in the second
half of the sample, with the ratio of net long-term capital gains to
income subject to tax increasing from 9.6 percent in 1994 to 20.9 percent
in 1999. This same ratio for the basic industrial grouping of manufac-
turing, FIRE, and all other industries suggests that FIRE is particularly
reliant on net long-term capital gains but that the cyclical nature and
recent increase is also evident for manufacturing and other industries.
By 1999, 13.2 percent of income subject to tax for manufacturing firms
was net long-term gains.
Given that the cyclical nature and upward trend in this ratio may reflect
the dynamics of income subject to tax rather than the dynamics of net
long-term capital gains, the second panel of Table 2 demonstrates that
those same trends hold when scaling net long-term gains by total assets.
Tn 1999, firms across all industries realized net long-term capital gains
equal to 0.45 percent of total assets, which represented a sharp increase
over the decade. The bottom panel of Table 2 aggregates all gains, com-
pares them to total assets, and finds largely similar results. The upward
trend in gains realizations appears to be particularly significant for the
manufacturing sector.
5. EVIDENCE FROM TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS
Analyses of capital gains realization behavior for individuals have
employed the responsiveness of aggregate realizations to time-series vari-
ation in tax rates. For example, Eichner and Sinai (2000) follow Auerbach
(1988) in estimating long-run elasticities on the basis of sucha time-series
analysis. While limited in several ways, such an analysis of corporatecap-
ital gains realization is a useful starting point prior to turning to firm-level
data.
Before turning to the time-series regressions, it useful to geta sense of
the general pattern in realization behavior and to compare it to the time-
series pattern of individual realization behavior. Figure 2 traces the rela-
tionship between realization behavior at the individual level and the
corporate level. It also plots the ratio of individual capital gains to house-
hold financial assets and the ratio of net long-term corporate capital gains
to total assets. Burman and Plesko (2002) provide a version of this figure
but deflate the two nominal series and conclude that a correlation of 0.97
exists over the period. Scaling realization amounts as in Figure 2 provides
a similar conclusion regarding the high level of correlation between these
series. Plesko (2002) interprets the high correlation between corporate
and individual realization in the time series as evidence of some omitted0.5 -




--Individual realized capital gains as a share of hausehold financial asscls
Corporate capital gains realizations ass share af total carporate assets
FIGURE 2. The Importance of Capital Gains forIndividuals and
Corporations, 1954-1997
Note: The figure plots the ratio of realized individual capital gains tohousehold financial assets (on the
left axis) and the ratio of realized corporate capital gains to total corporate assets(on the right axis) from
1954 to 1997. Corporate capital gains are defined as net long-termcapital gains reduced by net short-term
losses for all active corporations. Ratios are expressed in percentage terms.
variable in realization behavior that may bias estimated taxeffects for
individuals' capital gains realization behavior.27
Our goal is to identify variables that may beomitted from the standard
set of variables employed by Eichner and Sinai(2000) for individuals and
by Plesko (2002) for both individuals and corporations.In searching for
these omitted variables, we limit our analysis to corporatecapital gains,
which is the general focus of our paper, rather than estimatingmodels for
both individuals and corporations. Column (1)of Table 3 provides the
baseline specification that follows Plesko's analysis ofrealization behav-
ior for corporations, which in turn followsEichner and Sinai and others
in choosing explanatory variables. Thisspecification employs the log
value of aggregate corporate capital gains realization as adependent
variable and, in addition to the top corporate capital gains taxrate, con-
trols for the price level (as measured by the grossnational product
[GNP} deflator), the value of corporate equities (as measuredby the level
of the Standard & Poor [S&P] 500), and GNPand the first difference of
GNP. As with Auerbach (1988) and Eichnerand Sinai (2000), all values
27Plesko (2002) jointly estimates individual and corporate realizationsand concludes that










are first-differenced to accommodate concerns regarding the presence of
a unit root in these series.
The 9.20 coefficient on the corporate capital gains rate in column (1)
translates into a tax elasticity of 2.6. Starting with this baselineset of vari-
ables, we consider other variables that might capture factors influencing
realization behavior. Because these variables are available only after 1963,
the specification in column (2) provides an alternative baseline specifica-
tion for this shortened period, with estimated coefficientson the corpo-
rate capital gains rate that are approximately the same as for the longer
period examined in column (1).
Columns (3) to (6) of Table 3 consider several proxies for sentimentand
capital market activity that could influence these series. Baker and Wurgier
(2003) provide a review of various measures of sentiment and theirinter-
relationship. If managers can opportunistically time sales and capitalize
on market sentiment, these variables may explain realization activity.
Similarly, if these realizations are related to trends inmerger activity or
equity offerings, then measured responsiveness to taxes could be mis-
measured. Column (3) adds an additional control for the closed-end fund
discount, which has been used to proxy for market sentiment. Thecoeffi-
cient on the capital gains rate moves modestly and retains its high level of
significance, while variation in the closed-end fund discountappears to
be associated with realization behavior tosome limited degree. Column
(4) tests for the role of merger activity by controlling for the share of value
of the University of Chicago's Center for Research in Securities Prices
(CRSP) file that is acquired in a given year.28 Again, the coefficienton the
capital gains tax rate is largely unchanged and remains significant,while
this proxy for merger activity does notappear to determine realization
behavior significantly. Finally, the inclusion of the level of initialpublic
offering (IPO) activity in column (5) doesappear to play a significant pos-
itive role in determining realization behavior and reduces the leveland
significance of the coefficient on capital gains tax rate. Jointly controlling
for merger and IPO activity, as in column (6), producesa marginally signif-
icant coefficient that translates into a tax elasticity of 1.3, which isat the
upper end of Eichner and Sinai's estimated elasticities for individuals
Such a time-series analysis provides indicative evidence thatmeasures
of capital market activity may shape realization behavior either because
they provide an opportunity for corporations to disgorge capitalgains or
because they measure sentiment in a way that might shape realization
behavior. Further investigation of the role of thesemeasures of sentiment















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and capital market activity in determining individualand corporate real-
izations seems warranted. Inclusion of thesemeasures of capital market
activity still produces large, if only marginallystatistically significant, tax
elasticities for corporate realization behavior.Obviously, while this time-
series analysis has the advantage of capitalizingon significant variation in
capital gains tax rates, it suffers from well-knowneconometric problems.
To investigate the effect of capital gainstaxes on realization behavior fur-
ther, we turn to analysis of firm-level data.
6. EVIDENCE FROM CORPORATEFINANCIAL
REPORTS
Much as Burman and Randolph (1994) andAuten and Clotfelter (1982)
investigate individual realization behavior using microdata, this section
employs firm-level data to investigate whethera firm's tax position influ-
ences the decision to dispose of assets and the nature of gainand loss
recognition. We use financial reporting data fromStandard & Poor's
Compustat industrial database to shed lighton corporate capital gains
behavior. Financial statements include severalitems related to taxable
capital gains. First, firms report their proceeds fromthe sale of invest-
ments and their proceeds from the sale of property, plant,and equipment
(PPE). Presumably, the sale of investmentscaptures many assets defined
by the tax code as capital assets and the saleof PPE captures so-called
section 1231 assets (which can createa combination of capital gains and
ordinary income). For these variables,we use data from 1980 to 2002.
Obviously, observing sales proceeds doesnot necessarily inform us about
the recognition of gain or loss. For theyears 1987 to 2002, Compustat
reports the gain (or loss) on the sale of assets. This variable,however, may
not match taxable capital gains (or losses) perfectly forseveral reasons.
First, financial reporting does not isolateassets using the tax code's defi-
nition of capital asset, so the financial reportinggain may include some
ordinary income. Second, for depreciableassets, the depreciation rules
differ between financial and tax accounting. Despitethese measurement
issues, we believe that financial reporting datacan shed light on corporate
capital gains behavior.
Unlike studies of individual capital gains realizationbehavior that use
tax return data, financial reporting data has two distinctlimitations. First,
using such sources implicitly relieson the decision of a firm to disclose
specific actions in public documents. Reportingdecisions are mediated
presumably by auditor advice and managerialmotives. Thus, it is unclear
a priori why reporting the presence or volume of asset salesor gain/loss
activity would be subject to anything but possiblymateriality concerns. InThe Character and Determinants of CorporateCapital Gains27
addition, we should emphasize thatfinancial accounting differs from tax
accounting, so the measured gain or lossfrom selling assets differs across
accounting systems. Second, publicfinancial documents do not allow one
to infer precisely the tax positionof a firm, which forces us to rely on prox-
ies devised by Graham (1996) thatlargely identify probabilities of having
net operating losses.29
Before turning to our regression analysisof when firms sell assets
and the associated gains or losses, thedescriptive statistics in panel B of
Table 4 provide some useful information.To measure the propensity of
different events, we create dummy variablesfor whether a firm reports
(1) some proceeds from the sale of investments,(2) some proceeds from
the sale of PPE, (3) a gain from the saleof assets, and (4) a loss from the
sale of assets.30 For the period from 1980 to2002, 26 percent of firm-year
observations contain positive values forthe sale of investments, and
50 percent report the sale of PPE, indicatingthat asset disposal is fairly
common. With regard to gainsand losses, the sample is limited to the
period from 1987 to 2002, but the implications aresimilar. Over this period,
45 percent of firm-year observations containeither a net gain or loss, with
26 percent of those being gains and 19percent characterized as losses.
As such, gain or loss recognition appearsto be fairly common over the
sample period.
The two panels of Table 5 analyze thedeterminants of disposal deci-
sions by examining how taxesinfluence the decision to sell investments
(panel A) and PPE (panel B). The first threecolumns of each panel employ
a dummy variableequal to 1 if there is a nonzero value forthe sale of
either investments (in panel A) or PPE (inpanel B) as the dependent vari-
able. We estimate linear probability modelsfor the various extensive mar-
gins that we examine so that we caneasily incorporate firm fixed effects
in the econometric specification.The remaining three columns use the log
of the value of those sales as the dependentvariable. In examining the size
of the sales, we include only observationsthat have the particular type of
sale; hence, the regressions are conditional onhaving a sale and do not
combine the effects of the explanatoryvariables on the extensive and
intensive decisions regarding asset sales. Assuch, the latter three columns
of both panels analyze whether taxesinfluence the magnitude of these
sales conditional on the presence of arecorded sale. All specifications
29We thank John Graham for making his tax-ratevariables available via his Web site at
http://www.duke.edu/Hgraham/. Additional discussion of the methodologyunderlying
his tax-rate measure is available in Graham(1996).
The dummy variables for recognizing a gain or a loss arecreated from a single continu-
ous measure of the net gain from assetsales; hence, we cannot infer whether a firm simul-
taneously recognizes gains and losses.28Desai & Gentry
TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Analysis
StandardNumber of
Note: Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the sample employedin the time series analysis presented
in Table 4. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the sample employedin the panel analysis presented
in Tables 5 and 6. "Log deflated net long-term capital gains realizations" isthe log value of net long-term
corporate capital gain realizations described in the paper. "Corporate capital gainsrate" is the applicable
corporate capital gains rate over the sample period. "Log S&P 500 index" is the logvalue of the S&P 500
index over the sample period. "Log GNP deflator" is the log value of theGNP deflator over the sample
period. "Closed end fund discount" is the average closed end funddiscount over the sample period.
"Percentage of CRSP value acquired" is the share of CRSP value acquiredin a given year as presented in
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001). "Number of IPOs" is the number ofinitial public offerings in a
given year. "Sale of investment dummy" is a dummy variable equalto 1 if a corporation reports the sale
of investments in a given year. "Log proceeds from sale of investments"is the log value of those sale pro-
ceeds. "Sale of PPE dummy" is a dummy variable equal to 1 ifa corporation reports the sale of PPE in a
given year. "Log proceeds from Sale of PPE" is the log value of thosesale proceeds. "Gain dummy" is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if a corporation reports the gainon the sale of investments and PPE in a given
year. "Log value of gain" is the log value of that gain value. "Loss dummy" isa dummy variable equal
to 1 if a corporation reports the loss on the sale of investments and PPE ina given year. "Log value of
loss" is the log value of that loss value. "Marginal tax rates"are calculated via the methodology described
in Graham (1996). "Log total assets" is the log value of total firmassets. "Log q ratio" is the log of the q
ratio calculated from Compustat data as described in thepaper.
MeanMediandeviationobservations
Panel A: times series analysis
Log deflated net long-term
capital gains realizations
-1.1533-1.2068 0.6601 44
Corporate capital gains rate 0.28820.28000.0367 44
Log real GNP 8.41738.47750.4640 49
Log S&P 500 index 1.2663 1.16820.5286 49
Log GNP deflator 2.94472.9313 0.4036 44
Closed end fund discount 8.86699.3820 8.1197 39
Percentage of CRSP value
acquired
1.22% 1.09% 0.85% 36
Number of IPOs 352 351 263 40
Panel B: panel analysis
Sale of investment dummy 0.25870.00000.4379 91,325
Log proceeds from sale
of investments
1.39751.28343.2458 23,626
Sale of PPE dummy 0.50161.0000 0.5000 76,325
Log proceeds from sale of PPE-0.7323-0.7012 2.7451 38,284
Gain dummy 0.26270.0000 0.4401 67,741
Log value of gain -0.2014-0.22312.8163 17,797
Loss dummy 0.18510.00000.3884 67,741
Log value of loss -1.9489-2.06362.5255 12,541
Marginal tax rates 0.20740.2943 0.1839 100,646
Log total assets 4.67014.5446 2.3820 100,646































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































employ firm fixed effects and, as a consequence,are identifying tax effects
from within-firm variation in a firm's tax status.
The first column of both panels employs only firm-levelvariation in tax
rates as an explanatory variable and finds that firms time their disposalof
investments and PPE to occur in years associated with lowtax rates. The
estimated coefficients imply that when a firm's effective marginaltax rate
is 10 percentage points higher, the probability of the firm sellinginvest-
ments decreases by 0.46 percentage points and the probability of it selling
PPE decreases by 0.75 percentage points. Both of theseestimated effects
are statistically different from zero at the 99 percent confidence level.
While firm fixed effects control for a host of unobservablecharacteris-
tics, it is useful also to control for firm size and investmentopportunities
by including the natural logarithm of total assets and thenatural loga-
rithm of a proxy for a q ratio.31 Becausewe add these control variables to
the specification with firm fixed effects, the econometricidentification for
the size and investment opportunity variables arises from eachfirm's size
and investment opportunities changingover time. The second column of
each panel includes these additional control variables and finds thatthe
tax effects identified previously remain statistically significant andare
diminished only slightly. Turning to the estimated coefficientson the con-
trol variables, we find that when a firm is larger, it ismore likely to sell
investments but less likely to sell PPE. When firms have betterinvestment
opportunities (i.e., higher values of q), they are less likely to sell PPE (and
this estimated effect is statistically different from zero), whichis not con-
sistent with the idea that firms sell assetsas a source of financing when
opportunities are good but outside sources of financeare limited. We do
not find the relationship between investment opportunities and thesale
of investments to be statistically different fromzero.
By including firm fixed effects, our econometric identificationstrategy
focuses on within-firm variation over time. Some of thisintertemporal
variation arises from legislated changes in the tax schedule,and some of
the variation comes from changes in each firm'stax position for a given
tax code (e.g., how it is affected by loss offset rules). In part,to separate
these sources of variation, we includeyear fixed effects in the specifica-
tion reported in the third column of each panel in Table5. The inclusion
of year fixed effects in the regressions hasa quite small effect on estimated
effects in the sale of investment regressions, but the estimatedeffects in
the sale of PPE regressions change considerably (e.g., theestimated coef-
ficient on the marginal tax rate shifts from 0.0669 in thesecond column
31This q ratio is the ratio of total assets plus the difference between the marketvalue and
book value of equity to total assets.The Character and Determinants of Corporate CapitalGains31
to 0.1223 in the third column).One possible explanation for this result is
that the time-series changes in the level of the corporatemarginal tax rate
are correlated with changes indepreciation rules (which are not as relevant
for selling investments that are not typicallydepreciable assets). The year
fixed effects may be capturing how changingdepreciation rules affect the
propensity to sell PPE, and these differences maybe correlated with the
level of the tax rate.
The final three columns of each panel of Table 5provide a similar analy-
sis using the log value of proceeds fromthe sale of investments (in panel
A) and PPE (in panel B) as the dependentvariable. Conditional on selling
investments or PPE, a firm's tax rate isnegatively related to the volume of
its investment or PPE sales. Theseestimated effects are statistically differ-
ent from zero at the 99 percentconfidence level. Including controls for
firm size and investment opportunities diminishesthe magnitude of the
estimated effect of the tax rate, but it retains its highlevel of significance.
While larger firms tend to sell a larger volumeof investments and PPE
(conditional on selling some assets), the estimatedeffect of investment
opportunities (as measured by q) on the size of investmentsales is posi-
tive, suggesting that firms with better investmentopportunities sell more
investment assets possibly as a source offinancing investment in new
projects. But the estimated effect of investmentopportunities on the size
of PPE sales is negative. Finally, theinclusion of year effects has little
effect on the size or statistical significanceof the estimated coefficients in
the PPE regression; however, for the sizeof investment sales, the esti-
mated effect of the marginal tax rate is muchsmaller and not statistically
different from zero, and the coefficients on theother explanatory variables
also change dramatically.
The two panels of Table 6 provide a similarempirical framework for
investigating the presence and magnitude ofgains and losses on the sale
of assets as reported by firms. In contrast tothe two panels of Table 5, the
two panels of Table 6, examine gainbehavior (in panel A) and loss behav-
ior (in panel B) separately, but we cannotdistinguish between invest-
ments and PPE. As noted above, 45 percentof all firm-year observations
are associated witheither a gain or loss, with the majority of these
nonzero observations beinggains. Again, the latter three columns meas-
ure the effect of taxes onthe size of gains and losses conditional on the
existence of either gains or losses.
In panel A of Table 6, the estimated effectsof tax rates are broadly con-
sistent with expectations. When a firm has ahigh marginal tax rate, it is
less likely to report a gain from the sale of assets.The estimates imply that
a 10-percentage-point increasein the marginal tax rate decreases the
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































YThe Character and Determinants of CorporateCapital Gains33
and these estimated effects arestatistically different from zero at the 95
percent confidence level. Furthermore,conditional on reporting a gain,
the gains are smaller when the firmfaces a higher marginal tax rate, and
this effect is statistically different from zeroin the specifications with con-
trols for firm size and investmentopportunities. In addition, when a firm
is larger, it is more likely to report gainsand, conditional on having a gain,
the gain is larger.
The behavior of reported losses, shown inpanel B of Table 6, is some-
what puzzling Contrary to the predictionthat firms with high tax rates
will value reporting losses, theestimated coefficients on the marginal tax
rate are negative for both theextensive margin of reporting a loss and the
intensive margin of the size of the loss(conditional on having a loss). Two
issues complicate the analysis of lossbehavior. First, as mentioned above,
much of the variation in Graham's (1996)estimates of marginal tax rates
is driven by the presence of operatinglosses. However, the firm's operat-
ing performance is not completelydivorced from whether it has gains or
losses on its existing investments. Forexample, poor operating perform-
ance may lead to both a lowtax rate and a large stock of potentiallosses
that the firm can recognize, which wouldbe consistent with the estimated
coefficients.32 Second, the netting rules for capitallosses complicate the
predicted relationship between tax rates andobserved net losses. Suppose
a firm has a high tax ratedue to having substantial operating income.
Because capital losses cannot be nettedagainst positive operating income,
it would not be surprising if wefound no relationship between the
observed tax rate and reporting a netloss.33
7. CONCLUSIONS
Corporate capital gains realizations are anincreasingly significant com-
ponent of corporate cash flow. Netlong-term capital gains are significant
compared to individual capital gains, and they areincreasingly impor-
tant. As this paper outlines, thedistortionary effects of such taxes largely
subsume those associated with individualcapital gains. Specifically, lock-
in effects at the corporate level mayalter productivity levels by changing
the patterns of corporate and assetownership in a manner that taxes on
individual capital gains do not.
32 This endogeneity between firm performance and the effective marginal taxrate would
bias against finding that high tax rates are associatedwith the lower propensity to recognize
gains that we report in panel A of Table 6.
To sort through these issues, it would behelpful to have separate data on gains and losses
so that one can observe howfirms match capital losses with capital gains; unfortunately, we
have data only on the net gain or loss.34Desai & Gentry
The time-series analysis of thispaper suggests that the elasticities of
corporate realizations to tax costs is higher than those derivedin similar
equations used to estimate the elasticities of individualcapital gains.
Micro analysis also suggests that firms time their salesand magnitudes of
investments and PPE opportunistically and that therealization of gains
appears to be shaped particularly by tax incentives. Insum, the corporate
capital gains tax regime appears to influence significantlythe decisions of
firms to dispose of assets and realize gains and losses.
Our empirical evidence captures onlyone dimensionrealization
behaviorof the effect of corporate capital gainstaxes. More generally,
these taxes are likely to influence business planningon various margins,
including merger activity the initiation and terminationof lines of busi-
ness, and the patterns of cross-holdings. In combination with thecurious
distinction between the treatment of intercorporatedividend payments
and intercorporate capital gains, the results in thispaper and these
broader consequences suggest that tax policy forcorporate capital gains
may be ripe for reevaluation and that much more needs to be understood
about how corporate capital gains taxes influence firmbehavior.
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